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ABSTRACT
Accurate, relevant and timely public health information is paramount 
in a humanitarian crisis: it can help to identify needs and priorities, 
guide decisions on interventions and resource allocation, monitor 
trends, evaluate the effectiveness of the response, support advocacy 
for human rights, and extract lessons that could be relevant in similar 
contexts. The present review shows, however, that the public health 
information available in humanitarian crises is, in general, inadequate 
and that its application is secondary to reasoning and incentives of 
a political nature, thus contributing to the recurrent failings of hu-
manitarian action. This article reviews the causes of this state of affairs 
– cultural, political/institutional/methodological and ethical – that 
hinder the production, dissemination, and use of information for 
determining which interventions should be implemented or modi-
fied. Traditional epidemiological skills and methods are poorly suited 
to humanitarian contexts. The approaches and tools that have been 
introduced in crisis contexts require validation and improvement. 
There is a need for more field “barefoot epidemiologists” who are able 
to collaborate with anthropologists, demographers, and sociologists 
to better understand the priorities to be addressed in a crisis. Evi-
dence, however, is not enough per se: it is political will that is the key 
factor in the use, or not, of information in decision-making concern-
ing humanitarian resources and interventions.
Keywords: information management, humanitarian crises, field epide-
miology, qualitative approaches, mortality
RIASSUNTO
Un’informazione di sanità pubblica accurata, pertinente e tempesti-
va è essenziale nelle crisi umanitarie: può aiutare a definire necessità 
e priorità, guidare le decisioni sugli interventi e l’allocazione delle 
risorse, monitorare le tendenze, valutare l’efficacia della risposta, di-
fendere i diritti umani ed estrarre lezioni che si possano applicare in 
contesti simili. Questa rassegna mostra, però, come, nonostante la 
crescente richiesta di dati per giustificare gli investimenti in assisten-
za umanitaria, l’informazione di sanità pubblica disponibile nelle 
crisi umanitarie sia, in generale, carente e secondaria a logiche e in-
centivi di carattere politico, contribuendo così ai ripetuti fallimenti 
che affliggono l’azione in questi contesti.
L’articolo passa in rassegna le cause culturali, politico/contestuali, me-
todologiche ed etiche che ostacolano la produzione, la circolazione e 
l’uso di informazioni per decidere quali interventi sanitari mettere in 
atto o modificare. Le competenze e i metodi epidemiologici classici 
sono poco adatti in un contesto umanitario e gli approcci e strumenti 
che sono stati introdotti richiedono di essere validati e raffinati. C’è 
bisogno di un maggior numero di “epidemiologi scalzi”, con esperien-
za sul campo e che sappiano lavorare con demografi, antropologi e 
sociologi per capire meglio le necessità prioritarie alle quali dare rispo-
sta in una crisi. L’evidenza di per sé, però, non è sufficiente: a essere 
determinante nell’uso o meno dell’informazione per le decisioni sulle 
risorse e gli interventi umanitari è la volontà politica.
Parole chiave: gestione dell’informazione, crisi umanitarie, epidemiolo-
gia sul campo, approcci qualitativi, mortalità
KEYPOINTS
n This review shows how public health information in emergencies 
is generally inadequate and its use is secondary to political 
incentives.
n The lack of accurate and timely information in a crisis can have 
catastrophic consequences on the health and well-being of affected 
populations and can result in the waste of precious resources.
n Traditional epidemiological expertise and methods are poorly 
suited to humanitarian contexts.
n Fundamental questions in humanitarian crises can be reduced 
to a definition of “good enough” evidence for guiding action in a 
given context.
n New, multidisciplinary approaches are needed to guide donors, 
governments of affected Countries and humanitarian practitioners.
n Political will, more than evidence, is the key factor in decision-
making concerning humanitarian resources and interventions.
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INTRODUCTION
Humanitarian action in the public health domain is de-
fined here as the set of interventions aimed at mitigat-
ing the consequences of crises – due to conflicts, famines 
or natural disasters – on morbidity and mortality. The ef-
fectiveness of this action depends on various factors. The 
most important among them include knowledge of the 
context, understanding of priority needs, and the correct 
and timely identification and implementation, on an ad-
equate scale, of the most appropriate interventions. The 
importance of information and evidence in making deci-
sions in a crisis context is obvious, but, as this article at-
tempts to demonstrate, it is not sufficient.1 Dijkzeul et al.2 
note that evidence in humanitarian crises must have two 
fundamental characteristics:
n it must be methodologically valid;
n it must be relevant to decision-makers.
Moreover, in the initial, acute phase of a crisis, timeliness 
is critical: responders have to «make hard decisions under 
pressure and with minimal information».3
In this article, we make the case that public health infor-
mation in crises is, in general, inadequate and its applica-
tion is often secondary to political reasoning and incen-
tives, thus contributing to the repeated failures that have 
affected humanitarian action.4 Remedies are, however, 
possible and are included in the recommendations.
PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATION IN CRISIS CONTEXTS
First of all, it is important to distinguish two categories of 
information:
1. evidence relating to the potential effectiveness of health 
interventions in humanitarian settings (for example, clini-
cal management of acute malnutrition, immunisation strat-
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egies, psychosocial activities to promote mental health);
2. contextual information, that is the information on the 
health status of the population, the priority health needs 
and risks, the availability of services, and the delivery of 
humanitarian action.
EVIDENCE ON INTERVENTIONS
The evidence base for public health interventions in cri-
ses remains thin, as demonstrated by a recent systematic 
review that highlights important gaps in the quantity and 
quality of available studies.5 The review shows, for exam-
ple, that knowledge on non-communicable disease inter-
ventions in crises is very limited: only eight studies could 
be identified, none of which included cancers. These gaps 
re-emerge in a review of the evidence used in the Sphere 
project:6 only 13% of dozens of standards for the health 
sector were based on strong formal evidence, while the rest 
were merely supported by practical experience.7
CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION
In a 1948 article on the conditions of refugees and dis-
placed persons following the partition of India and Paki-
stan, Taylor candidly recognized that his writing was «based 
entirely on impressions».8,9 Half a century later, despite 
substantial advances in technologies, knowledge and prac-
tices in the humanitarian field,10 an editorial of Disasters 
magazine highlighted that: « […] reliable base-line statis-
tics are seldom available [… parties of the conflict tend to 
manipulate the information […] relief agencies, in the rush 
for funding, may promulgate statistics that owe more to 
guesswork and imagination than to research. News media 
tend to repeat and simplify these interpretations […]».11 
The British Department for International Development 
(DFID), one of the most influential government agencies 
of cooperation, in 2014 recognized that humanitarian de-
cisions are often based on low quality information.12
QUALITY OF DATA
A series of reviews on the quality of nutrition and mortal-
ity surveys in emergencies, critical for assessing the health 
status of the affected population, highlighted important 
problems in standardization of methods as well as errors 
in the design and implementation of the studies.13,14 The 
most recent and complete analysis concluded that only 
35% (No. 368) of the nutrition surveys and 3% (No. 
158) of mortality studies carried out in crisis situations 
met minimum quality criteria.15
The late epidemiologist Hans Rosling,16 providing tech-
nical assistance to the Ministry of Health of Liberia at the 
peak of the Ebola epidemic, had to admit: «We are abso-
lutely sure that we cannot be sure about the data».17
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QUANTITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF DATA
There seems to be a consensus on the inadequate quali-
ty of information in humanitarian crises. Conversely, the 
opinions on the quantity and accessibility of information 
diverge. In the early stages of a crisis, a lack of even mini-
mal data that are readily available and of sufficient cover-
age, is common. For example, during the first six months 
of the crisis, essential information, such as the prevalence 
of acute malnutrition, the immunisation coverage for 
measles (a major cause of mortality in many crises) and 
even the geographic locations and programmatic areas of 
intervention of humanitarian actors (the so-called matrix 
“Who is doing What and Where” – essential for effec-
tive coordination) were available only in 43%, 15%, and 
15%, respectively, of important armed conflicts between 
2010 and 2015.18 The lack of information was even more 
pronounced in natural disasters, despite the fact that this 
type of crisis generally attracts more funding and occurs 
in populations more easily accessible than in conflict-re-
lated situations.
In many crises, however, the main problem is not the lack 
of data, but rather their accessibility.19 Health authori-
ties and humanitarian agencies expend substantial time 
and resources to produce a wide range of potentially use-
ful information, including situation analyses, needs as-
sessments, project proposals, routine activity data, surveil-
lance data, and internal reports. However, the majority 
of this information is often not standardized, not com-
piled into integrated documents or interoperable databas-
es nor sufficiently disseminated and, therefore, remains 
inaccessible and unused by the UN and other coordina-
tion mechanisms and the health authorities of the crisis-
affected Countries.
In some cases, the information produced is redundant 
or, in the worst instances, contradictory. According to 
the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disas-
ters (CRED), about 30 mortality studies were conduct-
ed in Darfur (Sudan) between 2003 and 2005. In 2004, 
WHO20 and the World Food Program (WFP)21 carried 
out two mortality surveys, a few months apart and in the 
same region, which produced divergent results: according 
to WHO, the mortality exceeded the emergency thresh-
old and required a rapid scale-up of the humanitarian re-
sponse, while for WFP the mortality rates were below the 
emergency threshold.
Beesley and colleagues22 describe how, during the first 
years of independence in South Sudan, the Ministry of 
Health received such a “deluge” of data, analyses, and 
plans from aid agencies that it saturated the limited ab-
sorption and decision-making capacity of its small num-
ber of officials: a typical example of information overload.
CONSEQUENCES
In humanitarian crises, needs invariably exceed resources, 
even in “noisy” emergencies, which attract substantial aid. 
A sound situation analysis would prevent or reduce the 
waste of resources, by guiding the allocation of resources 
to priority needs; in crisis settings, however, data are invar-
iable weak and incomplete, and dispersed among different 
people and institutions. The lack of accurate and timely 
information can have catastrophic consequences (seldom 
documented) for the populations affected by the crises. 
For example, the British DFID decided in 2001 to tem-
porarily suspend food aid to Darfur (a region of Sudan in 
chronic crisis), based on the biased results of a rapid need 
assessment carried out by an NGO, despite the availabil-
ity of methodologically valid data showing a serious mal-
nutrition and food insecurity situation.23 More recently, 
the failure to disseminate clear data on the trends of the 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa during the first half of 2014 
was a significant determining factor for the serious delays 
in the Ebola response.24 Currently, there are doubts about 
the true extent of the food crises resulting from conflicts 
in South Sudan and Yemen, where UN statements of ac-
tual or imminent famine have been contradicted by an-
thropometric data that, despite being inaccurate and ge-
ographically unrepresentative, present the situation as 
less severe than  expected.25 In Syria, health professionals 
complain about the lack of analysis for an objective prior-
itisation of chronic diseases, neglected by many actors in 
favour of war surgery, perceived as more important.26 The 
consequences of the delays of the humanitarian response 
to the 2011 famine in Somalia, in terms of death toll, were 
also extremely grave (see box 2 p. 222).
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THE CAUSES OF THE POOR STATUS
 OF PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATION
Like all complex pathologies, the disease that affects infor-
mation in humanitarian crises has multiple, complex and 
interdependent causes.
CULTURAL CAUSES
The attitude “we must act immediately” is part of the hu-
manitarian culture. This may be justified at the beginning 
of an acute crisis, when a timely response that addresses 
basic needs (shelter, water, food, sanitation, health), based 
on the experience of other crises in similar contexts, helps 
to define humanitarian interventions and to save lives. 
However, in chronic and complex crises, this reaction may 
result in the acceptance of data collected or analysed using 
questionable methodologies or even of estimates from un-
reliable sources. Thus, humanitarian interventions may be 
designed and implemented based on unproven assump-
tions or without a proper situation analysis.27,28 Moreo-
ver, there is a common tendency of replicating interven-
tion modalities used in previous crises without adaptation, 
a cultural phenomenon well described in the humanitar-
ian sector.29
Particularly in insecure contexts, humanitarian workers 
often live in “bunkerized” compounds, separated from 
the rest of the population.30  Multiple factors may create 
obstacles to effective communication and a 
real understanding of needs, including strict 
security rules, language barriers, specialist 
competence prioritised over knowledge of 
the local context, as well as economic con-
ditions, values,  and cultural and social be-
haviours that are very distant from those of 
the affected population.31-33 During the Eb-
ola outbreak in West Africa, the initial failure 
to understand the local sociocultural norms 
– for example, practices surrounding burial 
of the dead - led to unwanted consequenc-
es, such as the refusal of communities to re-
port cases of disease and death, which result-
ed in increased transmission of the disease.34 
These barriers have methodological implica-
tions for obtaining information: for example, 
questionnaires must be developed in such a 
way as to be understandable and acceptable 
to both local interviewers and interviewees; 
issues that are culturally sensitive may need 
to be avoided or investigated indirectly; in 
some cultures, it is inadmissible for a woman 
to be interviewed by a man and/or in the ab-
sence of her husband.
POLITICAL/CONTEXTUAL/LOGISTIC CAUSES
Humanitarian contexts, especially those related to armed 
conflicts, are unstable, unpredictable and uncontrollable.35 
Common difficulties of information management in re-
source-poor contexts tend to be amplified in crisis situa-
tions. Insecurity may not only prevent access to the pop-
ulation on which information is to be collected, but may 
also damage the health infrastructure that produces epide-
miological data, including the breakdown of routine health 
information systems.36 Furthermore, healthcare workers’ 
efforts may be diverted from data collection to other priori-
ties; registers may be lost; transmission of information may 
be hindered by communication and security problems; and 
key local health staff may emigrate (along with their pre-
cious institutional memory), while there may be an influx 
of outsiders that lack knowledge of local realities.
Other factors also constrain the collection of complete, accu-
rate, and timely data. It is widely accepted that the “humani-
tarian space” is shrinking.37 Some Western governments use, 
or abuse, humanitarian assistance in order to pursue strate-
gic objectives in politically risky areas, such as Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Syria. Non-governmental actors, including armed 
groups, can prevent access to humanitarian agencies, as has 
happened in Somalia with Al-Shabaab, in Afghanistan with 
the Taliban and in Iraq and Syria with Daesh.38
The counter-terrorism legislations of donor governments 
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can result in enormous bureaucratic barriers to humani-
tarian assistance in these areas.39 In some situations, lo-
cal authorities hinder or prevent humanitarian access, or 
even expel humanitarian organizations for documenting 
sexual violence and other human rights abuses, with very 
serious consequences for humanitarian assistance, as hap-
pened in Darfur in 2009 and in Pakistan in 2017.40,41 In 
addition, authoritarian regimes tend to control informa-
tion, prevent its dissemination, and hamper independent 
research: Iraq before 200342 and Syria before 2011 are cas-
es in point.
Furthermore, crisis contexts are often volatile: mass pop-
ulation displacements can be rapid, overturning the hu-
manitarian situation within days or weeks, and thus mak-
ing data obsolete. In 1994, hundreds of thousands of 
Hutu refugees crossed the borders of Rwanda into Tan-
zania and the former Zaire (Now Democratic Republic of 
Congo) within a matter of days, catching the governments 
and humanitarian agencies unprepared. A similar situa-
tion occurred in September 2017, when Rohingya from 
Myanmar fled to Bangladesh.
The political geography of a crisis is often complex: violent 
or insecure areas frequently border on relatively quiet zones; 
in very large Countries, such as the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo or Sudan, data aggregated at national level con-
ceal these differences. A further difficulty concerns urban 
areas and/or dispersed populations, where data collection is 
a much more complex and expensive exercise than in popu-
lations concentrated in refugee camps.
The governments that most significantly finance humani-
tarian aid and upon which UN agencies and most NGOs 
are dependent,43 often adopt essentially ideological de-
cisions, even when the evidence to support their choices 
is insufficient or contradictory. In so-called fragile Coun-
tries, where governments and institutions are weak, certain 
choices are imposed by donors without enough political di-
alogue with the national counterparts. The contracting out 
of health service provision to NGOs in Afghanistan after 
the defeat of the Taliban in 200144 and, more recently, the 
scaling up of performance-based financing in Haiti in the 
aftermath of the earthquake are just two examples.45
The polarized nature of many crises favours “strategic dis-
information”, including the political manipulation of sur-
vey results, as the box 1 illustrates.
This is not a new phenomenon: during the Vietnam war, 
political pressures within the US government encouraged 
the overestimation of enemy casualties and the under-
counting of enemy forces.53 The barriers to obtain infor-
mation and the manipulation of data are not limited to 
mortality or war crimes: in Ethiopia, health agencies were 
forbidden to report cases of cholera, a disease perceived 
as a symptom of insufficient development and a poten-
tial obstacle to commercial relations. WHO itself delayed 
the international alarm on the Ebola epidemic for many 
months in 2014, claiming potential negative repercus-
sions for the economies of the three Countries affected.24
Sometimes economic reasons may be the sole motivation 
for governments or international agencies to inflate the 
number of people in need, with the hidden aim of obtain-
ing more aid54 (sometimes for personal purposes) or, con-
versely, to reduce their number in order to minimize or 
deny the crisis. 
The fragmentation of aid, with multiple NGOs, UN 
agencies, and other organizations competing for fund-
ing,55 exacerbates the difficulties in coordinating the col-
lection, standardisation, and consolidation of data. Dif-
fering indicators, various data collection tools, diverse 
samples, different reference periods, and unequal quali-
ty in data collection can make the compilation and analy-
sis of data as frustrating as trying to complete a puzzle us-
ing pieces from different boxes. This was the experience of 
one of the authors in South Iraq after the 2003 war: the 
impossibility of translating a huge amount of data from 
health unit assessments into a coherent framework for the 
identification of humanitarian priorities.56
BOX 1. THE POLITICS OF NUMBERS
Both the US and British governments criticized, on a 
flawed methodological basis, the mortality surveys 
carried out in Iraq after the 2003 war and which 
showed a considerable mortality excess among 
civilians.46,47 The US resistance to acknowledging 
the scale of the insurgency it was facing was at 
the root of the criticism. By the same token, the 
Ugandan government requested WHO in 2005 
to conduct a mortality survey in the North of the 
Country, where an armed rebellion and an equally 
brutal counteroffensive by the government army 
were ongoing. Since the results showed an excess 
mortality and the inadequacy of the humanitarian 
response, the government rejected the survey 
and banned its publication.48 WHO decided not to 
protest.49,50 The same politicisation of data occurred 
in Sudan: the government refused to endorse 
the findings of a survey carried out, with WHO 
support, in Darfur in 2004,51 when its president was 
under accusation for violation of human rights. In 
consequence, one of the authors of this review had 
to carry out another survey the following year, which 
had to offer guarantees of impartiality well in excess 
of the accepted standards for this type of study.52
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In Haiti, after the 2010 earthquake, various health need 
assessments were carried out, using eight different data 
collection tools, with the result that: «there was not an 
absence of data, but rather an abundance of it, collected 
in different formats, on different platforms, using differ-
ent indicators and with varying degrees of comprehensive-
ness».57 Moreover, the capacity of health coordinators to 
produce a coherent need analysis, by synthesizing availa-
ble data,58 is often insufficient, as experienced by the au-
thors during training courses for this personnel.
Competition between agencies discourages information 
sharing.59,60 Furthermore, a UN report acknowledged 
that «the delays [in information dissemination] can be at-
tributed, in large part, to a lack of willingness by agencies 
to prioritize reporting on activities».61
Information that is publically accessible is often limited 
to absolute numbers indicating the amount of services 
rendered to the affected population (for example number 
of children vaccinated, number of hospital admissions); 
however, as these data are disconnected from the denom-
inator (population actually requiring such services), they 
little contribute to the analysis of the situation.
Finally, the resources allocated to health information are 
often insufficient. On the one hand, donor governments 
are demanding more and more data in order to justify hu-
manitarian aid to tax payers; on the other hand, they are 
reluctant to finance the collection and analysis of data, 
giving priority to direct humanitarian assistance.
METHODOLOGICAL CAUSES
Traditional epidemiological methods (case-control, co-
hort, randomized controlled trials – RCT) that are rou-
tinely used to measure the effectiveness of health inter-
ventions in the field are rarely applicable in humanitarian 
settings, for a number of reasons. On the one hand, there 
are the limitations of context, time, logistics, and ethics, as 
discussed in this review; on the other hand, there is a gen-
eral lack of secondary data necessary for selecting repre-
sentative samples and defining appropriate control groups.
A thorny problem is the judgment of causal attribution 
in the evaluation of the effectiveness of an intervention (or 
a package of interventions) in terms of improved health 
indicators. The presence of many organizations on the 
ground with similar programmes, the simultaneous im-
plementation of interventions in other sectors, the vola-
tility of the situation, and other contextual factors exter-
nal to the intervention make a judgment of causality often 
impossible, especially when the chain of factors that links 
the intervention to the results is long and complex:62 it is 
more prudent to reason in terms of contribution rather 
than attribution.
The cluster randomized trials,63 that aim at an unbiased 
assessment of the effectiveness of public health interven-
tions at community level through a comparison with con-
trol communities that do not receive the intervention, 
have limited application in emergencies for operation-
al, financial, and ethical reasons.64 At the methodologi-
cal level, such experimental approaches are considered un-
suitable to examine complex processes and phenomena 
involving multiple interacting and non-linear causal fac-
tors; their external validity is also limited, given the im-
portance of contextual factors specific to each crisis.65 Re-
cently, alternative approaches have been tested, such as 
those based on “stepped-wedge” study designs as well as 
(especially in the mental health field) the use of “waiting 
list” controls in situations where the intervention, as a re-
sult of operational limitations, is introduced sequential-
ly.66,67 The most common approach used in evaluation 
remains the before-after-intervention comparison, which 
must, however, take into account that many factors can 
confound the cause-effect attribution.68
The difficulties of cultural, political, methodological, and 
ethical nature in the evaluation of humanitarian inter-
ventions have promoted the development of “realist” ap-
proaches, in which the context where the intervention is 
applied, the methods for its implementation, and also the 
unexpected results become important aspects to be ana-
lysed.69,70 This approach can help to understand why the 
same intervention can reach different degrees of effective-
ness according to the context, and which implementation 
modalities have been modified so that the intervention 
achieves its potential effect in a humanitarian situation. 
Bradt argues that it is not so much the scientific evidence 
that is missing, but rather the understanding of the most 
effective ways of implementation in specific humanitari-
an settings.71
Similarly, the tendency to combine quantitative and qual-
itative methods (mixed methods) for assessing the needs 
and the effectiveness of interventions has become com-
mon practice among humanitarian workers.72 Some fac-
tors -– cultural, political etc. – that affect the performance 
and use of health services or the exposure to risk factors 
cannot be analysed in a quantitative way, raising the di-
lemma of how to “measure the immeasurable”.73
There is a general lack of expertise in epidemiology and 
allied disciplines (demography, anthropology, sociology, 
economics) with methods adapted to the specific context 
of crises.74,75 These methods are not part of the stand-
ard training curriculum in epidemiology.76 With the ex-
ception of Epicentre (a centre for research and training in 
field epidemiology affiliated to Médecins sans Frontières), 
EPIET (the European Program for Intervention Epidemi-
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ology Training), CDC, and few other centres in European 
and US universities, training in this area is very limited in 
relation to the needs.
Humanitarian crises frequently affect Countries with frag-
ile institutions. Routine secondary data, such as epidemi-
ological surveillance, coverage of health interventions and 
death, and birth rates may be not-existent, or have been 
destroyed, or are incomplete, obsolete and of low quality 
and coverage. The crisis further worsens data production 
and analysis. This implies, among other things, that it is 
difficult or even impossible to refer to pre-crisis levels of 
health indicators for comparisons with the values  found 
during the crisis.
Estimating the size of the affected population, an essential 
step for planning humanitarian interventions is particularly 
difficult, unless in a refugee/IDP (Internally Displaced Per-
sons) camp setting. Census data, with projections based on 
growth rates, are often the only source for obtaining popu-
lation estimates, although disaggregated data do not always 
exist and these estimates do not take into account increased 
mortality and population movements. For example, it is es-
timated that more than half of the Syrian population has 
sought refuge abroad or is internally displaced as a result 
of the conflict.77 Various methods of rapid estimation, re-
quiring specific expertise, have been proposed; only some 
of them have been validated.78 Immunisation coverage data 
combined with health activity data have long been used to 
estimate  population numbers;79 recently, the use of satel-
lite-based imagery has been tested in various contexts,80 as 
well as mobile phone network data that have been used to 
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track the movement of communities affected by the earth-
quake in Haiti.81
The lack of household or individual listings, a common 
feature of emergency settings, precludes the use of simple 
random sampling in health surveys; cluster and purposive 
sampling (i.e., based on the selection of a non-represent-
ative sample and easy to implement) are the most com-
monly used approaches. The former method has, howev-
er, limitations in precision, due to the “design effect”;82 
the latter method is particularly prone to biases. A clas-
sic example of the lack of precision of cluster sampling is 
the above-mentioned first mortality survey in Iraq after 
the 2003 war: the study estimated 98,000 excess deaths 
among civilians, with a 95% confidence interval of 8,000- 
196,000.45
An additional constraint is insecurity that can prevent the 
access of humanitarian workers to certain areas: the com-
munities living there will not be selected in the sample 
and the findings of the survey will have, therefore, a lim-
ited external validity.
Retrospective household surveys, especially those estimat-
ing mortality, have high risk of biases, due to the fact that 
members of the family may not precisely remember the 
dates of dramatic events such as the death of a family mem-
ber, or mistakenly refer to members of the extended fami-
ly. The use of pre-tested questionnaires and local calendars 
with events known to all (for example religious holidays, 
first day of the agricultural harvest, date of an armed attack) 
serves to mitigate, but not completely eliminate, these risks. 
For this reason, the retrospective period to be studied is usu-
ally short, at most a few months, which, in return, requires 
sufficiently large samples (usually at least 500-1,000 house-
holds) to achieve the desired precision.
Another problem, common in populations where the im-
pact of the crisis has been geographically concentrated, 
is the “survivor” bias (the exclusion from the sample of 
households of which all members have died or that have 
disintegrated following displacement), which results in 
the underestimation of mortality, attack rate of an out-
break or prevalence of acute malnutrition.83 Variants of 
the traditional retrospective survey – the main inform-
ant84  and the neighbours methods85 – have been intro-
duced with the aim of reducing the risk of bias and col-
lecting sensitive information (such as for gender-based 
violence). The gold standard is prospective epidemiolog-
ical surveillance, which uses various information sources 
(community health workers, traditional and/or religious 
leaders, grave diggers, etc.); this approach is preferable to 
retrospective surveys in stable populations (such as those 
of some refugee or IDP camps), especially because it gen-
erates data in real time and allows a quick response.
A frequent criticism is that the quantitative methods of 
needs assessments do not give sufficient voice to the pop-
ulations affected by a crisis.86 To address this concern, the 
HESPER scale87 was developed, which provides a quick 
and validated qualitative method to describe the perceived 
needs of affected communities; the scale is commonly as-
sociated with quantitative approaches.
ETHICAL CAUSES
On the one hand, there is an «ethical imperative to collect 
good quality data» in humanitarian crises.88 On the oth-
er hand, the production of information and evidence is an 
area undermined by complex ethical problems.89
Data collection can consume resources that would be best 
used in urgent relief activities. Inquiries can raise expecta-
tions of assistance, which will not always materialize. Ob-
taining informed and voluntary consent can be difficult, 
especially when fieldwork needs to be completed within a 
tight timeframe and in precarious security conditions, or 
where participation in a study can be perceived by affected 
communities as a requirement to receive assistance. Peo-
ple included in a study can be traumatized by the conse-
quences of the crisis and interviews may be intrusive, for 
example in mortality surveys. Interviewees can even be ex-
posed to risks when politically sensitive information is so-
licited, for example on violence and abuse. Ensuring the 
security of the people included in a study and the confi-
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dentiality of the data thus becomes an imperative, par-
ticularly in violent contexts.90 Furthermore, «information 
flows outside; the last people to have access to it are the 
victims themselves».91 
Finally, the lack of coordination, as discussed above, can re-
sult in a “survey fatigue” if several agencies request the same 
information from the same people, without providing any 
concrete assistance.92 In 2004, 107 communities in Darfur 
(Sudan) were surveyed; of these, 33 were subjected to two 
or more studies, and two communities to five or more.92
From a mainly research perspective, it is fundamental to 
ask oneself if the evidence available from non-humani-
tarian contexts or from similar crises is applicable to the 
specific crisis in question and, if not, what evidence is 
really needed to provide an effective and contextually ad-
equate humanitarian response. For example, following the 
earthquake in Haiti, amputation rates varied substantial-
ly among surgical teams of different Countries.93 These 
data stimulated the development of guidelines for surgery 
in humanitarian crises, including the recommendation to 
collect and publish epidemiological data.94
SOME CONCLUSIONS AND A FEW SUGGESTIONS
Given the methodological challenges and other difficulties 
concerning information in humanitarian crises, the fun-
damental questions can be reduced to a definition of what 
constitutes “good enough” evidence to guide humanitar-
ian action in a given context.95 The experience and evi-
dence accumulated over years of humanitarian assistance 
are often sufficient for deciding on priority interventions 
in the initial acute phases of a crisis.96 In chronic and 
complex humanitarian settings, it may not be feasible to 
do more than showing, with rational arguments and plau-
sible judgments, that certain interventions, when based 
on a sound situation analysis, logically lead to the desired 
health outcomes and a reduced risk exposure, although 
the causal chain cannot be demonstrated through strictly 
epidemiological criteria.97
It is important to emphasize again that information, even 
when valid, relevant and timely, per se does not automatical-
ly translate into correct choices in due time. Other factors, 
such as those related to political expediency, availability of 
resources, internal organisational considerations, or simply 
the subjective conviction of key stakeholders, can influence 
decision-making or, on the contrary, determine inaction 
(see box 2). Furthermore, sometimes the information, al-
though rigorous, is not communicated in an effective and/
or timely manner to the decision-makers, especially where 
such decisions are taken far away from where the informa-
tion is collected and by those who do not know the context 
well or do not understand the data limitations.
If public health information in humanitarian crises is ill, 
are there realistic and effective remedies? 
It has been suggested that there is the need for increased fi-
nancial resources for data collection and analysis. Accord-
ing to Checchi, USD 15-25 million per year, or about 1% 
of the total humanitarian health aid, would be enough 
to increase the number of information managers, support 
capacity building at country level, strengthen local infor-
mation infrastructure, produce guidelines, create a cen-
tral data repository, develop the necessary software, and 
equip the health coordination bodies for emergencies with 
the staff required for covering this important area.101 To 
achieve this, donors should be convinced that a limited in-
vestment – such as the one proposed – could quickly pay 
off, contributing to the improvement of the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the humanitarian response.
With more resources available, NGOs and UN agencies may 
require the few qualified centres to expand their training ac-
tivities in epidemiological and information management 
methods for their staff, using the experience and the already 
available technical resources and on the basis of an agreed 
upon curriculum. With a greater pool of epidemiologists, it 
would be possible to ensure the field presence of profession-
als in key humanitarian operations, to strengthen local hu-
man resources and ensure that they can benefit from remote 
technical assistance. It would also be important to foster col-
laborations on the ground and technical exchanges between 
epidemiologists and specialists in other disciplines equally 
important in humanitarian crises – such as anthropologists, 
sociologists, demographers, psychologists, and economists – 
with joint training and regular technical meetings.
BOX 2. THE DELAYS OF THE HUMANITARIAN 
RESPONSE TO THE 2011 FAMINE IN SOMALIA
In Somalia, alarming levels of food insecurity were 
documented as early as of the beginning of 2010, 
but it was not until July 2011, when 11 million 
people had long been in extreme need for food, 
that the combination of the declaration of famine 
by the United Nations, a media campaign and strong 
pressures from the international community set the 
humanitarian machine in motion.98 When aid reached 
a level proportional to the needs, at the end of 2011, 
mortality rates were already declining.99
The consequences of this delay, also determined by 
the obstacles posed by the rebel group Al-Shabaab 
and by the counter-terrorism legislation of the US, 
were extremely serious: the excess deaths were 
estimated at 244,000-273,000, of which about half 
were of children under 5 years of age.100
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Funds could be used to promote applied research, in or-
der to validate and refine existing epidemiological meth-
ods to estimate the number of people affected by a crisis 
and mortality levels, ensure an adequate surveillance of 
outbreaks, etc. 
Recently, a group of agencies has produced a series of 
standards for public health information services in emer-
gency settings.101 These standards should be supported by 
technical guidance to be used in training and to help field 
staff in their implementation.
Many of the evaluations carried out are internal to the 
agencies that have commissioned them; the findings, 
which are not always disseminated, are used more often 
to draw lessons than to assess the effectiveness of humani-
tarian programmes and assume responsibility for achieve-
ments and flaws.102 Therefore, it would be important to 
promote and finance more independent evaluations and 
ensure their wide dissemination.
More funds alone, however, will not be enough for redress-
ing the weaknesses that affect public health information. 
The first step would be acknowledging that many of the 
problems related to public health information are not ex-
clusive to the humanitarian enterprise, but are exacerbat-
ed by the conditions under which it operates. Many of the 
political and social obstacles encountered in humanitari-
an crises and affecting health are of a complex, long-stand-
ing, and “wicked” nature; «they are difficult or impossible 
to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and chang-
ing requirements. These are often difficult to recognise».103 
New, multidisciplinary approaches, that include qualitative 
components, are needed to better understand these contexts 
and guide donors, governments of affected Countries and 
humanitarian practitioners. Field epidemiological methods, 
adapted to humanitarian crises, can contribute with the rig-
our of their quantitative techniques.
Finally, it is important to restate that the evidence is only 
part of the equation, and it is not enough in itself: the 
main incentive to use it, or not, in decisions on resources 
and interventions for addressing humanitarian problems 
is political will; humanitarian actors can exert little lever-
age with politicians.
Unfortunately, for many politicians, Rennie’s quote re-
mains valid today: «When beliefs conflict with evidence, 
beliefs tend to win».104
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